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PLAINTIFF CULPABILITY AND THE 
NEW ZEALAND TORT OF INVASION OF 
PRIVACY 
Lisa Tat* 
The tort of invasion of privacy is still a relatively new cause of action in New Zealand, which means 
that there are many novel issues that the courts will face in future cases that require consideration. 
One such issue is that of plaintiff culpability. While the concept is not entirely novel, it is yet to be 
examined in depth. The concept was discussed in the High Court decision of Andrews v TVNZ and 
the case forms the basis of analysis in this article. Drawing on case law from New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom the article examines the concept of plaintiff culpability and determines what it 
means and how it should be considered in an invasion of privacy action. The facts of Andrews v 
TVNZ are revisited to illustrate how the results of the analysis might be applied in future cases. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Privacy is an elusive concept; there is no one definition that fully encapsulates what is meant by 
the term.1 Broadly speaking, privacy is a person's concern over their accessibility to others.2 This 
accessibility could be in the form of knowledge or information about an individual, physical access, 
or the extent to which a person is the subject of others' attention.3 In other words, the meaning of 
privacy takes its form according to the context in which its protection is sought. 
  
*  Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington.  
1  See for example, Nicole Moreham "Privacy in the Common Law" (2005) 121 LQR 628, 636-643; Geoffrey 
Palmer "Privacy and the Law" [1975] NZLJ 747; William Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal L Rev 383; 
Raymond Wacks (ed) Privacy (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Hants, England, 1993) Volume I 
Part I.   
2  See for example, Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421, 423; Moreham, 
ibid, 639; Michael Tugendhat QC and Iain Christie (eds) The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002) xi. 
3  Gavison, ibid. 
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It was not until the Court of Appeal's decision in Hosking v Runting4 that a tort of invasion of 
privacy was confirmed as existing in New Zealand. The New Zealand tort is concerned with 
wrongful publicity given to private lives.5 The two fundamental requirements for a claim of an 
invasion of privacy are:6  
(1) The existence of facts7 in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
and 
(2) Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person. 
These two requirements provide the basis of the tort, but as the majority in Hosking v Runting 
recognised, the scope of the tort must be developed incrementally by the courts in future cases.8 An 
issue that is ripe for development is that of plaintiff culpability; that is, what is the relevance of a 
plaintiff who has done something "bad" and wants to prevent its publication? There have been 
several New Zealand invasion of privacy cases where the plaintiff has behaved "badly", but it has 
not been clear how, if at all, the courts have taken that fact into account.   
The aim of this article is to determine what plaintiff culpability means and how it should impact 
on the New Zealand tort of invasion of privacy. The recent High Court decision of Andrews v TVNZ 
will form the basis of analysis in this article, as it is the only case thus far to have expressly 
discussed the issue of plaintiff culpability. After a brief introduction to the case, the next part of the 
article looks at what plaintiff culpability means in the context of an invasion of privacy claim. Using 
that definition, the article then looks at why culpability should be taken into account under the tort 
of invasion of privacy, and then how it should be considered under the tort. Lastly, Andrews v TVNZ 
will be revisited to consider how plaintiff culpability could have affected the outcome. 
This article reaches the following conclusions. First, plaintiff culpability entails behaviour where 
the plaintiff could be described as having been, at least partly, responsible for the publicity 
  
4  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
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complained of. Second, culpability in itself is not determinative of an invasion of privacy claim. 
Culpability is, however, a factor to consider under the defence of legitimate public interest. Finally, 
the plaintiffs' culpability should have been considered under the public interest defence in Andrews 
v TVNZ. Even though the culpability would not have affected the outcome, it is important to treat it 
as an independent consideration to set a precedent that can be applied in future invasion of privacy 
claims.  
II ANDREWS V TVNZ 
A Facts 
The plaintiffs were husband and wife. One night after attending a party and consuming an 
unspecified quantity of alcohol they had a serious road accident as they drove home. While never 
explicitly stated, it was implied that the accident was caused by the driver's excess blood alcohol 
level. The plaintiffs were trapped in the vehicle and it was necessary to use heavy equipment to free 
them. It transpired that a television crew was filming the rescue mission for a programme that 
documented the lives of fire fighters. The plaintiffs were completely unaware that the filming had 
taken place; they found out about it only when the footage was aired during an episode of the 
programme on TV One.  
A considerable amount of the footage was devoted to depicting the plaintiffs while they were 
trapped in the car, primarily in respect of their interaction with rescue staff. Included in the footage 
aired were the intimate conversations shared between the husband and wife where the wife was 
rather distressed. There was, however, no reference to the cause of the accident or the fact that each 
plaintiff was significantly over the legal blood alcohol limit. Neither plaintiff was charged with 
driving over the limit, because the police could not ascertain who was driving the vehicle. The 
plaintiffs sued Television New Zealand for an invasion of privacy in respect of the conversations 
and scenes depicted in the programme.  
B The Judgment of Allan J 
Allan J held that the broadcast did not amount to an invasion of the Andrews' privacy, despite 
their successful argument that they were entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of 
their conversations. Allan J found that due to the intimate nature of the conversations, the Andrews 
were entitled to expect that the conversations would not be given further publicity.9 However, the 
Andrews failed the "highly offensive" test. The judge ruled that a reasonable person in the shoes of 
the plaintiffs would not have found the broadcast of the conversations during the television 
programme to be highly offensive.10 Further, had it been necessary, Allan J would have upheld a 
  
9  Ibid, para 65 Allan J. 
10  Ibid, para 71 Allan J. 
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defence of legitimate public concern in including the footage of the conversations in the 
programme.11  
A notable omission from Allan J's judgment is that his Honour did not discuss the relevance of 
the Andrews' "bad" behaviour. That is, he did not discuss whether the fact that the driver of the 
vehicle was drunk at the time of the accident was a relevant consideration under the tort. The 
omission is curious because his Honour had earlier in his decision discussed the potential relevance 
of plaintiff culpability under the tort of invasion of privacy. The facts in Andrews v TVNZ provided 
a good opportunity to test the new principle, yet the case was decided without explicit reference to 
the relevance of plaintiff culpability. Nevertheless, Allan J's discussion about plaintiff culpability 
provides a basis for analysis of the issue.  
III PLAINTIFF CULPABILITY 
On the issue of plaintiff culpability, his Honour said that:12 
On occasion, it may be appropriate in assessing the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, to take 
into account the culpability or blameworthiness of the plaintiff. 
… 
It is difficult, and indeed undesirable, to lay down any general principle governing the extent to which 
personal culpability might impinge upon reasonable expectations of privacy .… The character and 
seriousness of blameworthy conduct, or iniquity, will vary significantly from case to case. The effect of 
such conduct on a reasonable expectation of privacy will therefore also vary. 
I accept, however, that an expectation of privacy, otherwise reasonable, may in certain circumstances be 
lost by reason of culpability on the part of the plaintiff. It is to be observed that the same consideration 
might well arise in a given case in the course of an assessment of whether publication of private facts is 
highly offensive, and further, in relation to the defence of legitimate public concern.  
At first instance, this passage appears to provide useful guidance about plaintiff culpability. 
However, upon a closer inspection, the passage is, with respect, not particularly illuminating. First, 
Allan J never gave a definition of "plaintiff culpability". Secondly, the issue of where to consider 
culpability remains unresolved, because ultimately, his Honour said that culpability could be 
considered under any component of the tort. These two issues will be dealt with in turn.  
A Scope of Plaintiff Culpability 
Plaintiff culpability, as the name implies, entails some kind of "bad" behaviour. Allan J used the 
terms "culpability", "blameworthiness", and "iniquity" in his discussion of plaintiff culpability.13 
  
11  Ibid, para 91 Allan J. 
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These words have connotations of behaviour that deserves punishment or that should not be 
protected. When applied to an invasion of privacy claim, the terms suggest that the plaintiff brought 
the publicity upon him or herself, or was at least partly responsible for, or deserved, the publicity. 
On one hand, the Andrews were simply unlucky that the fire fighters attending their accident 
happened to be followed by a television crew. However, on the other hand, they were not the 
victims of another driver's negligence, but instead were well over the legal alcohol limit and were 
the authors of their own misfortune.14 On this view, the plaintiffs had brought the publicity upon 
themselves. 
However, what about behaviour that is "bad", but which is not behaviour that could be described 
as "asking for" publicity? Bad behaviour, after all, could still be described as "blameworthy" 
behaviour. Take the example of a person who cheated on her husband. Broadly speaking, extra-
marital affairs are still generally considered "bad" behaviour. Nevertheless, if the husband wished to 
publish details of the affair in a newspaper, the wife could hardly be said to have brought the 
publicity upon herself. Thus, at least from Allan J's discussion, the wife's bad behaviour would not 
qualify as culpable behaviour. So, it is necessary to determine the kind of bad behaviour that is 
relevant in an invasion of privacy case: is it any kind of bad behaviour or is it behaviour where the 
plaintiff was instrumental in creating the publicity? 
Further guidance can be sought from how the New Zealand and English courts have dealt with 
bad behaviour in invasion of privacy cases. The United Kingdom does not have a tort of invasion of 
privacy; invasion of privacy claims are brought under the tort of breach of confidence. However, 
when an action for breach of confidence is brought in respect of a privacy claim, the requirements of 
the tort are similar to those under the New Zealand tort of invasion of privacy.15 Most of the New 
Zealand cases have not expressly discussed the issue of the plaintiff's bad behaviour, but in some 
cases an inference can be drawn about how the courts have treated it. The English cases, on the 
other hand, have been more explicit in their treatment of "bad" plaintiffs.  
B Types of Plaintiffs 
At this point, it is necessary to draw a distinction between public and non-public figures, and 
further, between voluntary and involuntary public figures. These distinctions are important in the 
area of privacy, because the level of privacy attaching to each type of plaintiff differs. A voluntary 
public figure has been described as:16 
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a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling 
which gives the public a legitimate public interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has 
become a "public personage". 
Involuntary public figures, on the other hand, are essentially ordinary members of society (that 
is, non-public figures) that have, through some event or other occurrence, been placed in the public 
spotlight. They have been described as:17 
individuals who have not sought publicity or consented to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise 
have become a legitimate subject of public interest. They have, in other words, become "news". 
The distinctions between these plaintiffs impact upon what constitutes culpable behaviour for 
each type of plaintiff; so the facts that constitute culpable behaviour will differ, depending on the 
type of plaintiff involved. However, the reasons underpinning why the behaviour is culpable are the 
same. In other words, the reason why certain behaviour is culpable is the same regardless of the type 
of individual that is concerned. 
C Voluntary Public Figures 
The kind of bad behaviour that is relevant in public figure cases often involves hypocrisy. The 
English courts are more experienced than the New Zealand courts in the area of privacy claims 
brought by public figures, and in particular, celebrities.18 The English courts have not been 
sympathetic towards hypocritical public figures. Hypocrisy is the situation where the public figure 
has presented a certain image that is favourable towards his or her career, but then acts in a 
contradictory manner. In other words, the public figure has presented a false image to the public. 
The case of Woodward v Hutchins19 illustrates the concept of hypocrisy. The case concerned a 
well-known group of singers. The defendant was the group's press relations agent who, after the 
termination of his employment with the group, began writing stories for a newspaper about the lives 
of the members of the group. Lord Denning MR, in discharging the interim injunction granted to the 
group, stated that:20 
There is no doubt whatever that this pop group sought publicity. They wanted to have themselves 
presented to the public in a favourable light so that audiences would come to hear them and support 
them. … If a group of this kind seek publicity which is to their advantage, it seems to me that they 
  
17  American Law Institute Restatement of Torts (2 ed, St Paul, Minnesota, 1971) §652 D. 
18  See for example, A v B [2003] QB 195 (CA); Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL(E)); McKennitt v 
Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194 (CA); Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137; Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 
WLR 760 (CA).  
19  Woodward v Hutchins, ibid.  
20  Ibid, 763 Lord Denning MR. 
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cannot complain if a servant or employee of theirs afterwards discloses the truth about them. If the 
image which they fostered was not a true image, it is in the public interest that it should be corrected. … 
The public should not be misled.  
Thus, the behaviour that the court considered was relevant to the group's invasion of privacy claim 
was the fact that the group had presented a false image: this was more than just the bad behaviour of 
the singers behind closed doors. The public figures brought the publicity upon themselves by 
presenting a false image and running the risk that the truth would be exposed.   
A similar situation was seen in Campbell v MGN Ltd,21 which concerned an internationally 
famous supermodel. Naomi Campbell had made numerous announcements to the media that she 
was drug-free, but was subsequently photographed leaving Narcotics Anonymous. Because 
Campbell had misled the public, the media had a right to set the record straight in respect of her 
drug addiction and the fact that she was receiving treatment. The House of Lords, however, 
acknowledged that had she not purported to be drug-free, she would have been entitled to privacy in 
respect of the information concerning her drug addiction.22 This observation suggests that bad 
behaviour, in this case, drug use, is not on its own enough to impact on an invasion of privacy claim 
or to deny privacy;23 the plaintiff's hypocrisy was determinative.  
The situation was slightly different in Theakston v MGN Ltd.24 The claimant was a television 
presenter on a programme aimed at younger audiences. After a night out drinking with friends, he 
entered a brothel and, according to the prostitutes, left without paying. After refusing their demands 
to pay, one of the prostitutes sold the story and accompanying photographs to the defendant's 
newspaper. The hypocrisy in Theakston's behaviour arose from two factors. First, Theakston had 
often spoken to the media about his private life and who he had intimate relationships with, or at 
least did not complain when it was published. Thus, to complain about the brothel story was 
hypocritical. Secondly, Theakston was a role model for his younger audiences. Even though he was 
not deliberately presented as a role model, Theakston was aware of his position and influence. On 
this view, Theakston's hypocrisy was similar to Campbell's case. The hypocrisy in Theakston's 
claim was relevant to the court's decision to refuse to grant an injunction in respect of the story.  
In the cases discussed, the public figures acted "badly" in the sense that the behaviour that they 
were trying to protect was, in itself, bad. For example, taking drugs is bad behaviour. However, they 
were also "bad" in the sense that they had presented false images to, or had misled, the public,25 
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which was what brought about the publicity. If they did not present a false image then the media, 
arguably, would not have had as great a motive or justification to publish the truth. The relevant 
"bad" behaviour in the public figure cases has been the behaviour in the second sense, that is, there 
must be something more than just bad behaviour. Thus, the public figure cases support the view that 
culpable behaviour requires bad behaviour in the sense that the public figures brought the publicity 
upon themselves. So, the type of culpable behaviour in cases involving public figures is the same 
kind of culpable behaviour referred to by Allan J in Andrews v TVNZ. 
D Involuntary Public Figures and Non-Public Figures 
In contrast to public figures, there is limited case law involving involuntary public figures and 
non-public figures. Nevertheless, the few decided cases suggest that culpability among these types 
of plaintiffs also requires an element of responsibility in the plaintiffs for the publicity.  
A common example of when involuntary public figures seek the protection of the tort of 
invasion of privacy is people with criminal convictions who wish to prevent the disclosure of those 
facts to the public.26 In one sense, the criminal convictions are already a matter of public record and 
are therefore public facts. Also, these aspects of privacy, or the lack of privacy, are created by 
statute and is beyond the realm of the tort. However, where the publicity moves beyond the function 
of statute the tort may become relevant.  
For example, in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd the plaintiff, who had been convicted of 
indecent assault upon boys a few years earlier, carried out a public fundraising campaign to raise 
money for a heart transplant.27 The media discovered and wished to publish the details of his 
convictions. Tucker sought an injunction on the basis that publication would be an invasion of his 
privacy. It was implicitly accepted that the convictions, though once public, had become private 
again through the passage of time,28 which triggered the application of the tort.  
The court did not discuss whether Tucker's bad behaviour was relevant. While Tucker's 
convictions constituted bad behaviour in itself, did he bring the publicity upon himself? In the 
context of Tucker's public appeal, the court felt that he had brought the publicity upon himself, in 
the sense that he put himself and his character forward to the public. In other words, Tucker had 
become an involuntary public figure. However, in terms of whether Tucker was culpable, it could be 
argued that the fact that his past behaviour had been bad was not relevant to his claim, because it 
was merely bad behaviour. While his convictions initially brought about publicity through becoming 
a matter of public record, they had reverted to being private facts and could not be said to have 
  
26  See Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC); Brown v Attorney-General [2006] 
DCR 630 (DC). 
27  Tucker v News Media Ownership, ibid.  
28  See also, Brown v Attorney-General, above n 26, para 62 Judge Spear. 
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brought about the widespread media publicity several years later. Rather, it was Tucker's public 
appeal for donations that brought about the publicity, as opposed to his bad behaviour alone. On this 
view, Tucker was not culpable and therefore his bad behaviour in itself was not a relevant 
consideration. 
In contrast, non-public figures do not act in a way that warrants widespread, or any, publicity 
about them, and as such there is unlikely to be any public interest in publicity about them. They 
might act "badly", but without more, they do not bring publicity upon themselves. For example, in 
CC v AB the claimant had an affair with the defendant's wife, which the defendant sought to have 
published in a newspaper.29 The claimant had a "public persona", but was not a public figure. He 
had not misled the public, nor had he moralised publicly on family life or his own sexual 
continence.30 Thus, he had not brought the publicity upon himself, and the fact that his behaviour 
was bad did not affect his invasion of privacy claim.31 As culpability requires an element of public 
interest in bad behaviour to drive the publicity, non-public figures are unlikely to be culpable in 
invasion of privacy cases.32 
E Conclusion: Plaintiff Culpability 
The cases support the view that plaintiff culpability requires more than merely bad behaviour; it 
requires an element of fault in the plaintiffs, or that the plaintiffs brought the publicity upon 
themselves. In other words, culpability refers to bad behaviour where the plaintiff is in some way 
responsible for the publicity, or at least ran the risk of the publicity occurring. It is not necessarily 
the bad behaviour itself that is culpable, as illustrated by the public figure cases. For example, in 
Campbell v MGN Ltd the plaintiff's culpability did not arise from the fact that she had taken drugs 
alone, but that she had earlier lied about not taking drugs. In Andrews v TVNZ, on the other hand, 
the bad behaviour, namely driving while drunk, was culpable in itself, because the plaintiffs ran the 
risk of having an accident and creating the publicity.  
Having an element of fault in plaintiff culpability in privacy cases is consistent with the 
underlying purpose of having the protection of a right to privacy. Having a right to privacy is to 
enable people to behave differently in a private context than the manner in which they would act or 
behave in a public setting.33 For example, "a person may speak totally properly in public but may 
  
29  CC v AB, above n 23. 
30  Ibid, para 52 Eady J. 
31  Ibid, para 30 Eady J. 
32  See also, L v G [2002] DCR 234 (DC): the defendant had taken photographs of the plaintiff's genital area 
and had them published in an adult lifestyle magazine. Although prostitution might be considered bad 
behaviour, the plaintiff could not be described as having brought the publicity upon herself and thus was not 
culpable. 
33  Ibid, 248 Abbot J. 
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swear volubly in private", yet the person is entitled to do both without the risk of public disclosure 
of the private use of bad language.34 The right to privacy is necessary to protect individual liberty 
and autonomy to act in private in a way that they would not in public for fear of public 
disapproval.35 But if the plaintiff's bad behaviour has brought about the publicity, the bad behaviour 
could affect the plaintiff's right to privacy, because the public's interest has been engaged. Whether 
that interest is legitimate or otherwise is a different issue.  
Even if a culpable plaintiff could be described as "deserving" the publicity, it does not 
necessarily mean that the media is justified in its publication. Plaintiff culpability does not act as a 
waiver of privacy or consent to publicity.36 However, culpability nevertheless should still be a 
consideration under the tort, as it operates in a manner similar to the defence of iniquity under the 
breach of confidence tort.  
IV PLAINTIFF CULPABILITY AND INIQUITY 
Allan J compared culpability to the iniquity defence in the English breach of confidence 
claims.37 The iniquity defence follows the equitable maxim "he or she who comes into equity must 
come with clean hands."38 The defence operates such that if the court considers that the plaintiff's 
personal conduct in respect of the information has been improper, then the court is entitled to refuse 
relief.39 In other words, equity will not protect claimants who, themselves, have also done 
something wrong or bad. So the defence of iniquity is concerned with fairness. In drawing the 
comparison, plaintiff culpability is relevant to an invasion of privacy claim because it might not be 
fair to allow plaintiffs to rely on their privacy rights to prevent publicity relating to their culpable 
behaviour, especially if they created the publicity. Thus, the relevance of culpability is also 
concerned with notions of fairness, rather than with punishing the plaintiff for his or her bad 
behaviour. If the plaintiffs brought the publicity upon themselves then they should not necessarily 
be able to hide behind the tort of invasion of privacy. 
However, while culpability might in some circumstances give the public a right to be informed 
about the behaviour, some might not agree that the public should be informed, and so perhaps 
culpability should not affect the tort. One commentator has said that "it is unclear how the public 
  
34  Ibid. 
35  See Charles Fried "Privacy" (1968) 77 Yale LJ 475, 483; Gavison, above n 2, 448. 
36  See Andrews v TVNZ, above n 7, para 78 Allan J.  
37  See for example, Lion Laboratories v Evans and Others [1984] 3 WLR 539 (CA).  
38  See generally Patricia Loughlan "The Historical Role of the Equitable Jurisdiction" in Patrick Parkinson (ed) 
Principles of Equity (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1996) 3, 26.  
39  Rebecca Taseff "Available Defences: the NZ Privacy Tort and the UK's Extended Action for Breach of 
Confidence" (2006) 2(10) Priv LB 141, 142. 
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interest is harmed by people labouring under incorrect impressions about the private lives of 
celebrities."40 Further, "if the concern is the moral damage to those influenced by role models, then 
surely publication of the information is central to causing such damage."41 The commentator 
appeared to be suggesting that the public interest might be better served by not informing the public 
that they had been misled by celebrities. With respect, it should not be assumed that it is in the 
public's interest to allow them to be misled by celebrities; it would not be fair for celebrities to gain 
from misleading the public.  
The culpability of the plaintiff should be taken into account in an invasion of privacy claim as it 
is relevant to determining whether the plaintiff deserves the protection of the tort. Culpability should 
impact on the tort in a way similar to the defence of iniquity in a breach of confidence action. In 
terms of how culpability is taken into account, it could affect a plaintiff's reasonable expectations of 
privacy, the highly offensive test, or the public interest defence.42 Allan J, however, made several 
references to the impact of plaintiff culpability on reasonable expectations of privacy,43 which 
suggests that he felt it was under the first limb that culpability should be considered.    
V REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
In Andrews v TVNZ, the communications between the plaintiffs were described as being of an 
"intimate character and of an altogether more personal nature than the information with which 
Hosking v Runting was concerned."44 The plaintiffs were held to have had a legitimate expectation 
that there would be no additional publicity given to the conversations.45 Allan J reached this 
conclusion without discussing the impact of the plaintiffs' culpable behaviour. Nevertheless, should 
culpability have been considered under the reasonable expectations of privacy test? 
A The Test of Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
Under the first limb of the tort of invasion of privacy, the test is whether there are facts in 
respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.46 There is no simple test to determine 
  
40  Tanya Aplin "The Development of the Action for Breach of Confidence in a Post-HRA Era" (2007) 1 IPQ 
19, 45. See also, Fenwick and Phillipson, above n 15, 786-805. 
41  Aplin, ibid, 45.  
42  Andrews v TVNZ, above n 7, para 47 Allan J. 
43  Ibid, paras 42-47 Allan J. 
44  Ibid, para 65 Allan J. 
45  Ibid, para 85 Allan J. It should be noted that the accident occurred in a public place, where there generally 
can be no reasonable expectation of privacy. Discussion about this issue is beyond the scope of this article, 
but for further discussion see Hosking v Runting, above n 4, para 164 Gault P and Blanchard J; Nicole 
Moreham "Privacy in Public Places" [2006] NZLJ 265. 
46  Hosking v Runting, above n 4, para 117 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
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what constitutes a private fact.47 Private facts have been described as "those that may be known to 
some people, but not to the world at large."48 Essentially, the inquiry into whether facts are private 
in nature involves an assessment as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect 
of that information.49  
The level of a reasonable expectation of privacy differs according to the individual involved.50 
For example, voluntary public figures will have lower expectations of privacy than involuntary 
public figures, who will also experience a lessening of expectations of privacy.51 Non-public figures 
have the highest expectations of privacy. Despite the differences, the question remains the same: 
should plaintiff culpability reduce an individual's expectations of privacy? 
B Allan J's Suggestions 
Allan J said that plaintiff culpability could affect the "reasonableness" of an expectation of 
privacy,52 which suggests that the greater the gravity of culpability, the less reasonable an 
expectation of privacy becomes. Allan J also said that "an expectation of privacy, otherwise 
reasonable, may in certain circumstances be lost by reason of culpability on the part of the 
plaintiff".53 This statement implies that even if the plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of privacy, 
the expectation could be denied by virtue of the culpability. Essentially, Allan J was saying that 
plaintiff culpability could lead to a failure of the reasonable expectations of privacy test. 
C Impact of Plaintiff Culpability on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
The reasonable expectations of privacy test is considered from the perspective of an objective 
reasonable person, which prima facie does not include considerations of culpability. The case of 
Brown v Attorney-General illustrates this point.54 In that case, the plaintiff was a convicted 
paedophile. The police, concerned at the plaintiff's risk of re-offending, printed and distributed fliers 
containing detailed information about the plaintiff to the neighbourhood where he was living. It 
  
47  Ibid, para 119 Gault P and Blanchard J. For further information about the reasonable expectations of privacy 
test, see Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (4 ed, Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2005) 756-
759. 
48  Hosking v Runting, ibid, para 119 Gault P and Blanchard J.  
49  Ibid, para 117 Gault P and Blanchard J. See also, Rogers v TVNZ (CA), above n 6, para 51 Panckhurst and 
O'Regan JJ. 
50  Hosking v Runting, ibid, para 121 Gault P and Blanchard J. See also A v B, above n 18, para 11 point (xii) 
Lord Woolf CJ for the Court. 
51  Hosking v Runting, above n 4, para 121 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
52  Andrews v TVNZ, above n 7, para 42 Allan J. 
53  Ibid, para 47 Allan J. 
54  Brown v Attorney-General, above n 26. 
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included the plaintiff's name, address, details of his convictions, and also a photograph of him. 
Judge Spear said that the test is whether an objective observer, as opposed to a convicted 
paedophile, would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, taking into account the surrounding 
circumstances.55  
The "surrounding circumstances" refers to the situation in which the facts were brought into 
existence,56 such as whether the facts were imparted in a public place or a private home. Could the 
surrounding circumstances include the plaintiff's culpability? In interpreting Judge Spear's 
application of the test, the distinction between merely bad behaviour and culpable behaviour 
becomes important. Judge Spear's test suggests that merely bad behaviour, without more, is not 
relevant to the reasonable expectations of privacy test. However, it is possible that the surrounding 
circumstances include the plaintiff's culpability.  
If culpable plaintiffs play a part in bringing about the publicity, it is arguable that the culpability 
would form part of the surrounding circumstances. The plaintiffs, by virtue of their culpable 
behaviour, create the situation or engage in behaviour where they can expect greater media interest. 
In that situation it becomes less reasonable for them to have as high an expectation of privacy than 
they would have had, had they not behaved culpably. This lessening of expectations of privacy is 
similar to that of public figures who, because they choose to put a part of their lives in the public 
spotlight, bring the publicity upon themselves, and as a result have reduced expectations of privacy.  
The analogy between culpable plaintiffs and public figures should not, however, be drawn too 
far. Often, in the case of public figures, personal information about them has been so widely 
published that that information or type of information has become a part of the public domain. In 
contrast, the argument that culpable plaintiffs have reduced expectations of privacy is based on the 
premise that a reasonable person in their position would realise that there is a level of public interest 
in their behaviour, because they created it themselves. Accordingly, the argument would be that this 
knowledge should reduce a person's expectations of privacy. There may be some overlap between 
the two categories in cases involving culpable public figures.57  
In other words, a culpable plaintiff's reduced expectations of privacy are fuelled by the public 
interest, and the plaintiff's awareness of that public interest, in their actions. It follows that, in 
determining whether a plaintiff passes limb one, a court would have to consider whether the level of 
public interest in the information is sufficient to deny a plaintiff his or her expectations of privacy. 
That is, would a reasonable person, knowing that they had created the public interest in their actions, 
  
55  Ibid, paras 71-72 Judge Spear. See also, Television New Zealand v Rogers, above n 6, para 50 Panckhurst 
and O'Regan  JJ. 
56  Brown v Attorney-General, ibid. 
57  For example, see Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 18; Theakston v MGN Ltd, above n 18. 
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expect the information to be private? This analysis begins to complicate the first limb of the 
invasion of privacy test.  
The purpose of considering public interest under the first limb would be to recognise that where 
a culpable plaintiff has engaged in behaviour that is of legitimate public concern, he or she cannot 
expect the information to remain private. The problem with this analysis is that the public interest in 
a particular case requires independent consideration, which is why it is a separate defence to the 
tort.58 Considering culpability under limb one would essentially combine what should be two tests 
into one. This result would be undesirable, particularly since the aim in doing so could also be 
achieved by considering culpability under the public interest defence. Thus, although the reasonable 
expectations of privacy test is wide enough to consider culpability, it would be better to consider 
culpability under the public interest defence. 
VI THE "HIGHLY OFFENSIVE" TEST 
Before the public interest defence is analysed, the highly offensive test will be discussed. The 
highly offensive test is the second fundamental requirement for a successful claim under the tort of 
invasion of privacy.59 The court must be satisfied that an objective reasonable person in the shoes of 
the plaintiff would find the publicity given to the private facts to be highly offensive.60 The focus is 
on whether the publicity is highly offensive and not on whether the facts are private.61 The test is 
concerned with publicity that is truly humiliating and distressful or otherwise harmful to the 
individual concerned; economic loss or personal injury is not necessary.62 
By this stage, the facts would have already been proven to be private. If the facts were private it 
would usually follow that publicity given to them would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
But that is not always the case, as seen in Andrews v TVNZ. Essentially, the tort is not intended to 
protect private facts that are not sensitive, and thus any publicity given to those facts would not be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
A The Test as Applied in Andrews v TVNZ 
In the light of the observations above, one would think that the plaintiffs in Andrews v TVNZ 
would have succeeded under the highly offensive test, as their conversations were held to have been 
of an intimate and personal nature. However, the plaintiffs failed. Allan J found that neither plaintiff 
  
58  Hosking v Runting, above n 4, para 129 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
59  But see, Rogers v Television New Zealand Limited, above n 6, para 25 Elias CJ. 
60  Hosking v Runting, above n 4, para 117 Gault P and Blanchard J. See also Rogers v Television New Zealand, 
ibid, para 67 Panckhurst and O'Regan JJ. For further information about the highly offensive test, see Todd, 
above n 47, 759-762. 
61  Hosking v Runting, above n 4, para 127 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
62  Ibid, para 128 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
 
 PLAINTIFF CULPABILITY AND THE NEW ZEALAND TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY 379 
could "point to anything" in the programme that was embarrassing or that showed them in a bad 
light,63 and implied that the conversations were "not really sensitive".64 His Honour said that the 
heart of the plaintiffs' complaint was that their consent was not obtained during the production of the 
programme.65 These factors combined led his Honour to the conclusion that the publicity was not 
humiliating or distressful.   
Allan J's analysis of the test is, with respect, questionable. First, it is contradictory to conclude 
that the intimate and personal conversations were anything other than sensitive. Secondly, Allan J 
was, in essence, equating "embarrassing" with "humiliating or distressful". The fact that someone is 
not embarrassed by the publicity does not necessarily mean that the publicity is not humiliating, 
distressful, or otherwise harmful. Embarrassment invokes feelings of self-consciousness, whereas 
humiliation and distress invoke feelings of pain or anxiety. Even if Mrs Andrews was not 
embarrassed by the publicity, a reasonable person in her shoes would still have been distressed to 
relive the moments where her husband was being cut out of a car wreckage, with the knowledge that 
it was being broadcast nationally.  
B Plaintiff Culpability and the Highly Offensive Test 
Allan J did not appear to have much sympathy for the Andrews. It is likely that a reasonable 
person in the shoes of the plaintiffs would have found the publicity to be highly offensive. So why 
did Allan J decide that the plaintiffs failed the test? It is possible that his Honour felt that because of 
the plaintiffs' culpability, they should not have been highly offended at the publicity.66 
In Campbell v MGN Ltd Lord Hope said that the highly offensive test requires placing oneself 
into the shoes of a reasonable person who is in need of treatment for drug addiction.67 In other 
words, the reasonable person has the sensibilities of a recovering drug addict. Lord Hope, however, 
made no reference to Campbell's culpable behaviour in respect of its impact on the highly offensive 
test. That omission was perhaps deliberate. As a recovering drug addict, even if Campbell had 
brought the publicity upon herself by lying about not taking drugs, that does not mean that a 
  
63  Andrews v TVNZ, above n 7, paras 67-68 Allan J.  
64  Ibid, para 71 Allan J. 
65  Ibid, para 69 Allan J. 
66  Ibid, para 67 Allan J. For example, his Honour referred to the fact that the programme did not mention the 
plaintiffs' excess blood alcohol level. He also placed heavy weight on the failure of either plaintiff to point 
to anything embarrassing or that showed them in a bad light in the programme, which seemed to be the basis 
of the failure under the highly offensive test. These factors suggest that Allan J thought that the situation for 
the plaintiffs could have been worse, and thus, perhaps, that the plaintiffs should not have been highly 
offended.  
67  Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 18, para 98 Lord Hope. See also, P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC), para 39 
Nicholson J. 
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reasonable person in her shoes would have found the publicity to be any less humiliating or 
distressful. Similarly, even though the Andrews ran the risk of publicity by driving while drunk, it 
does not somehow make the reasonable person in their shoes more immune to viewing the footage 
of the rescue scene.  
Thus, whether Allan J did or did not take culpability into account, culpability is not an 
appropriate factor to consider under the highly offensive test. Culpability does not give a reasonable 
person greater immunity that renders them less likely to be humiliated or distressed at publicity 
given to private facts. Culpability appears to be a rather artificial reason to fail the highly offensive 
test and it should not be a relevant consideration under this limb. 
VII THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENCE 
The analysis thus far has pointed towards the conclusion that culpable behaviour should be 
considered under the public interest defence.68 In Hosking v Runting, the public interest was 
confirmed to be a defence to the tort, rather than being an element within it.69 The tort must 
recognise that a person's desire for privacy must sometimes give way to the public interest in 
publishing certain facts or information.70 Matters of general interest or curiosity to the public, 
however, will not satisfy the public interest defence; there must be a legitimate public concern in the 
publication. The public interest defence should ensure that an individual could not use a privacy 
action to hide his or her culpability,71 but the level of legitimate public concern must be of 
sufficient gravity to outweigh the level of harm that is likely to be caused by the invasion of 
v
A 
pri acy.72  
Voluntary Public Figures 
Voluntary public figures, by placing their characters in the public eye, invite a certain degree of 
examination by the public into their backgrounds and lives. Therefore, there is a higher level of 
public interest in them than there is in an ordinary person. In A v B, Lord Woolf CJ said that in many 
situations it would be overstating the position to say that there is public interest in the information 
being published.73 However, his Lordship said that in these situations the public have an 
  
For further information abou68  t the public interest defence, see Todd, above n 47, 762-764; Tugendhat and 
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"understandable and so a legitimate interest in being told the information."74 These comments 
suggest that the publication of private facts could be justified simply because they relate to a public 
figu
ng merely the public's interest in the public figure; the public 
mu
at justified publication 
of t
ns for his hypocrisy was 
that 79
llowed …. The activity in question here may make viewers or the parents of 
ions on that false image and so they had a right to be told the 
truth in order to adjust their conduct. 
 
re.  
However, the Court of Appeal in Campbell v MGN Ltd said that just because a person has 
achieved prominence on the public stage it does not mean that "his private life can be laid bare by 
the media."75 Thus, where truly private or sensitive information is concerned, to justify the defence 
the public interest must go beyond bei
st have a legitimate right to know. 
Where a public figure does something bad, for example, uses drugs, there is a level of public 
interest in it, simply because it concerns a public figure. However, the level of public interest in the 
individual on its own would not necessarily outweigh the public figure's right to privacy. The 
presence of culpability can form the core of a successful public interest defence. This point was 
illustrated in Campbell v MGN Ltd,76 where it was Campbell's hypocrisy th
he fact of her drug addiction and treatment, not her drug addiction in itself.  
Plaintiff culpability can also add strength to a public interest defence. In Theakston v MGN Ltd 
the claimant had placed aspects of his private life and his general attitude towards sexual relations in 
the public domain.77 It followed that his expectations of privacy were lowered in respect of those 
matters, and correspondingly, the public interest in them was increased. Theakston's culpability in 
his hypocrisy strengthened the public interest defence.78 One of two reaso
 he had an image as a role model. On this point Ouseley J stated that:  
the very nature of his job as a TV presenter of programmes for the younger viewer means that he will be 
seen as somebody whose lifestyle … is one which does not attract moral opprobrium and would at least 
be generally harmless if fo
viewers react differently. 
Thus, the public had a legitimate interest in knowing about Mr Theakston's culpable behaviour, 
because the public had based their act
 
75  Worth Matravers MR, cited in 
194, para 65 (CA) Buxton LJ. 
ove n 18, para 68 Ouseley J. 
ara 69 Ouseley J.  
79  Ibid.  
74  Ibid. 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] QB 633, paras 40-41 (CA) Lord Phillips of 
McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 
76  Campbell v MGN, above n 18.  
77  Theakston v MGN Ltd, ab
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A similar situation was seen in A v B.80 The plaintiff was a well-known footballer who cheated 
on his wife with a lap dancer. He successfully applied for an interim injunction preventing the 
newspaper, to which the lap dancer had sold her story, from publishing the details of the affair. The 
injunction was discharged on appeal. The main reason was that the relationship was not one that 
should be protected where one party to the relationship wished to publish it.81 However, the 
culpability of the plaintiff's actions was also recognised and discussed under the public interest 
defence. Lord Woolf CJ stated that "footballers are role models for young people and undesirable 
behaviour on their part can set an unfortunate example."82 Again, it was the culpability of the public 
figure that supported the public interest defence. 
It might seem questionable that public figures are treated as having breached their duty to act 
responsibly when they engage in behaviour such as entering a brothel or having an affair. These 
activities are legal, and further, in today's society it is arguable that such activities are not still 
considered to be immoral.83 It would not constitute culpable behaviour for a non-public figure, or 
even an involuntary public figure, to engage in such conduct. Lord Woolf CJ in A v B provided an 
explanation for the law's treatment of such behaviour by public figures:84 
The public figure may hold a position where higher standards of conduct can be rightly expected by the 
public. The public figure may be a role model whose conduct could well be emulated by others. He may 
set the fashion. 
Therefore, voluntary public figures are in a different situation to other people, because they are in a 
position of influence over certain groups of the public, and that carries with it a higher standard of 
conduct.85 Thus, the public might have a legitimate interest in being informed about a public 
figure's culpability, because of the impact that a false image can have on the public's actions.  
  
80  A v B, above n 18.  
81  Ibid, para 43 Lord Woolf CJ for the Court. 
82  Ibid. 
83  See Stephens v Avery and Others [1988] Ch 449, 453 (Ch) Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C. 
84  A v B, above n 18, para 11 point (xii) Lord Woolf CJ for the Court. 
85  Some commentators have felt that the English courts have been too lenient in their considerations under the 
public interest defence and have accepted "flimsy" public interest arguments, with particular reference to 
celebrities and the "role models should not mislead" argument in Theakston v MGN Ltd and A v B. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the matter, but for further discussion, see Aplin, above n 40, 44-
51 and Fenwick and Phillipson, above n 15, 786-803.   
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B Involuntary Public Figures  
The case of Brown v Attorney-General86 provides an example of how the New Zealand courts 
have dealt with culpable behaviour in the context of an involuntary public figure. The police argued 
that there was a legitimate public interest in informing the residents that a convicted paedophile was 
living in their neighbourhood, which was to ensure that children were safe. Judge Spear ruled that:87 
Any legitimate public interest in a convicted and recently paroled paedophile living in the Strathmore 
community could have been met without releasing such extensive private information about the plaintiff 
to such a wide audience. 
Thus, there was a legitimate public interest in informing the public that a convicted paedophile was 
living in the community and it could have outweighed the plaintiff's right to privacy, but the 
information released was too extensive for the public interest to justify. The court did not say how 
restricted the information released had to be, but the court at least indicated that it is possible for 
plaintiff culpability to be considered under the public interest defence.  
C Conclusion: Public Interest 
The public interest defence lends itself well to considerations of plaintiff culpability. However, 
whether culpability forms the core of a public interest defence or enhances the defence, overall, the 
public interest must be of sufficient gravity to outweigh the invasion of privacy. Once it has been 
determined that the public interest defence does justify the invasion of privacy, it must still be 
determined how much publicity the public interest justifies.   
VIII NEXUS BETWEEN CULPABLE BEHAVIOUR AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST  
There must be a logical nexus between the plaintiff's culpable behaviour and the public interest 
defence that is raised.88 There are limits to the extent of publicity that a successful public interest 
defence will allow regarding the culpable behaviour. If the reason underlying the consideration of 
culpability is fairness, then the publicity should go only as far as bringing the culpability to the 
public's attention.  
However, determining what is necessary to satisfy the reasons for publication under the public 
interest defence is not a straightforward task. For example, in Campbell v MGN Ltd the public 
interest argument was that Campbell had misled the public and so the media had a right to put the 
record straight. Thus, on the majority's view, the public interest defence enabled the newspaper to 
expose the culpability by publishing the fact that Campbell was a drug addict and that she was 
  
86  Brown v Attorney-General, above n 26.  
87  Ibid, para 93 Judge Spear. 
88  See generally, Tugendhat and Christie, above n 2, 349-372. 
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receiving treatment. However, the details about her treatment at Narcotics Anonymous and the 
accompanying photographs went beyond what was necessary to inform the public of her 
hypocrisy.89 The minority, on the other hand, would have allowed those additional details to be 
published.  
This issue concerns the degree of "journalistic latitude" that is given to the media.90 The House 
of Lords accepted that in relation to the presentation of Campbell's drug addiction, a degree of 
journalistic latitude was appropriate.91 The minority, however, were prepared to stretch the degree 
of journalistic latitude further than the majority. The minority felt that publishing the details of 
Campbell's treatment at Narcotics Anonymous and the photographs fell within the degree of 
journalistic latitude given to the defendants,92 whereas the majority felt otherwise.93 However, the 
issue will remain one for the courts to determine in future cases, as it is beyond the scope of the 
present discussion. 
IX REVISITING ANDREWS V TVNZ  
Returning to Andrews v TVNZ, Mr and Mrs Andrews became involuntary public figures when 
the rescue team arrived with the television crew in tow at the scene of their car accident. For the 
reasons discussed earlier, there should have been a finding that there had been an invasion of the 
Andrews' privacy.94  
In an obiter dictum, Allan J said that he was prepared to uphold a public interest defence on the 
basis that the public have a right to be informed about the impact of road accidents on fire fighters 
and the costs to the public.95 However, was the plaintiffs' culpability in driving while drunk also 
relevant under the public interest defence? At first instance, it appears that culpability could have 
enhanced the public interest defence. It was most likely that the accident was caused by the driver's 
excess blood alcohol limit. Considering the high road toll in New Zealand caused by drunk drivers, 
there is a legitimate public interest in educating the public about the consequences of drinking and 
driving.   
  
89  See also Brown v Attorney-General, above n 26, para 93 Judge Spear; Theakston v MGN Ltd, above n 18, 
paras 78-79 Ouseley J. 
90  See also, Rogers v Television New Zealand, above n 6, para 128 Panckhurst and O'Regan JJ.  
91  For example, see Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 18, para 112 Lord Hope. 
92  Ibid, para 77 Lord Hoffmann. 
93  Ibid, para 124 Lord Hope. 
94  See Part VI The "Highly Offensive" Test. 
95  Andrews v TVNZ, above n 7, para 91 Allan J. 
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However, the Andrews were not claiming an invasion of privacy in respect of any publicity 
concerning their blood alcohol levels, because there was no publicity given to that information; they 
were instead complaining about the publicity give to their intimate conversations. Could the public 
interest in the culpability be used to justify the publicity given to the conversations? On the one 
hand, the conversations were caused by the plaintiffs' culpability, which creates a close nexus 
between the two and could possibly justify treating the conversations as a manifestation of the 
culpable behaviour. On the other hand, the public interest in educating the public about the costs of 
drinking and driving is not achieved by broadcasting the conversations, because the viewers were 
not told of the plaintiffs' excess blood alcohol levels.  
The first approach extends the taint of the culpability, because the culpability would be able to 
justify publicity given to information that was beyond the culpable behaviour itself. This approach 
has a greater focus on punishment than the second approach, which focuses on giving effect to the 
public interest argument. For the following reasons, the second approach should be adopted. First, 
the reason underlying the relevance of culpability in an invasion of privacy claim is concerned with 
fairness, rather than on punishing the plaintiff. Secondly, there must be a nexus between the 
culpable behaviour and the public interest. Had the programme mentioned the plaintiffs' blood 
alcohol level, plaintiff culpability would have enhanced the public interest. However, the Andrews 
were not trying to hide their culpability behind the tort, and the footage did not increase viewer 
awareness of the consequences of driving while drunk. Thus, plaintiff culpability would not have 
been able to enhance the public interest defence in Andrews v TVNZ. Even though the Andrews' 
culpability did not affect the outcome of the case, it is still important to give culpability independent 
consideration in order to create a precedent that can be followed in future cases.  
X CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff culpability is not a new issue in New Zealand invasion of privacy cases. It has appeared 
in several cases, but has never had an identity of its own, which has resulted in uncertainty and 
inconsistency. The confirmation of the tort of invasion of privacy in Hosking v Runting provided an 
opportunity to start again by building on the basic components of the tort set out by the Court of 
Appeal. 
Using guidance from the case law in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the following 
conclusions were reached on plaintiff culpability. First, plaintiff culpability requires more than 
merely bad behaviour, it requires behaviour where the plaintiff was, at least partly, responsible for 
the publicity. Secondly, culpability in itself is not determinative of an invasion of privacy claim. The 
best limb to consider culpability under would be the public interest defence, provided that there is a 
nexus between the two. Lastly, in Andrews v TVNZ a consideration of plaintiff culpability under the 
public interest defence would not have helped to justify the publicity, because broadcasting the 
footage would not have given effect to the public interest argument. That is, the publicity did not go 
towards educating the public about the consequences of drinking and driving, because the 
programme did not mention that the driver was drunk.  
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While considering plaintiff culpability under the public interest defence would not have changed 
the outcome of Andrews v TVNZ, it would nevertheless have dealt with culpability in a manner that 
could be followed in future cases. The conclusions reached in this article enable plaintiff culpability 
to be applied in future cases in a consistent manner to provide certainty in the tort of invasion of 
privacy.   
 
